Effective motor control involves both the execution of appropriate responses and the inhibition of inappropriate responses that are evoked by response-associated stimuli. The inhibition of a motor response has traditionally been characterized as either a voluntary act of cognitive control or a low-level perceptual bias arising from processes such as inhibition of return and priming. Involuntary effects of top-down goals on motoric inhibition have been reported, but involve the perseveration of an inhibitory strategy. It is unknown whether the inhibition of a motor response can be selectively triggered by a goal-relevant stimulus, reflecting the automatic activation of a top-down inhibitory strategy. Here we show that irrelevant flankers that share the color of a no-go target elicit the inhibition of their associated motor response while other-colored flankers do not, even when participants have sufficient time to prepare for the upcoming target while ignoring the flankers. Our results demonstrate contingent involuntary motoric inhibition: motoric inhibition can be automatically triggered by a stimulus based on top-down goals.
Effective motor control involves the execution of motor responses that are appropriate, given our goals and circumstances. An equally important component of effective motor control is the inhibition of an inappropriate motor response. The mechanisms underlying motoric inhibition have been of particular interest to researchers, as this process is believed to represent an important aspect of executive function (e.g., Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004; Baddeley, 1996; Logan, 1985) .
The inhibition of a motor response has traditionally been conceptualized as a voluntary act of cognitive control (e.g., Logan, 1983; Logan & Cowan, 1984) . In many studies of motor control, however, the motoric inhibition that occurs in response to a stimulus is typically required by the demands of the task (e.g., Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003; Aron & Poldrack, 2006; Logan, 1983; Logan & Cowan, 1984) , making it impossible to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary inhibition processes. Thus, whether and how motoric inhibition might occur through involuntary mechanisms of cognitive control remains poorly understood.
Overcoming interference by an irrelevant response-related stimulus is known to engage processes of motoric inhibition (Ridderinkhof, Band, & Logan, 1999; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2004) . Some cases of involuntary motoric inhibition have been demonstrated using variants of the flanker paradigm pioneered by Eriksen and Eriksen (1974) . In one such variant, an irrelevant flanker is presented simultaneously with a centrally presented target, and the location of the flanker is either validly or invalidly cued in advance of the target display. Under these conditions, an invalidly cued flanker produces the typical compatibility effect in which response times are faster on compatible (when the target and flanker are associated with the same response) trials than incompatible (when the target and flanker are associated with opposite responses) trials. A validly cued flanker, however, produces a reverse compatibility effect, consistent with the inhibition of the response associated with the flanker (Fuentes, Vivas, & Humphreys, 1999; Vivas, Fuentes, Estevez, & Humphreys, 2007) . Since the inhibition of the response associated with the flanker depends critically on processes related to inhibition of return in this context, it is believed to reflect a perceptual bias that is not driven by the goals of the observer (Vivas et al., 2007) .
Another example of involuntary motoric inhibition comes from studies in which an irrelevant response-associated stimulus is presented prior to the onset of a target. When this stimulus is followed by a mask, it also produces a reverse compatibility effect (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002) . This form of involuntary motoric inhibition is not well understood but is thought to depend critically on the ability of the mask to prime the response opposite the irrelevant stimulus (Jaśkowski, 2009 ). In addition, stop and no-go signals elicit motoric inhibition even when they are presented below the threshold of conscious awareness (van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, & Lamme, 2010; van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, & Lamme, 2009 ).
Well-learned stimulusϪno-response associations have been shown to have persistent effects on motoric inhibition. In a study reported by Verbruggen and Logan (2008) , observers learned to respond to certain kinds of stimuli (e.g., words referring to living things) while withholding responses to other kinds of stimuli (e.g., words referring to nonliving things). When these stimulusresponse contingencies are changed, observers were found to be slowed at responding to stimuli that were previously associated with the withholding of a motor response. Thus, observers perseverated in applying previously learned stimulusϪno-response associations, experiencing conflict between prior and ongoing learning. The presentation of stimuli previously associated with the withholding of a motor response has also been shown to activate the right inferior frontal gyrus (Lenartowicz, Verbruggen, Logan, & Poldrack, 2011) , which has been linked to response inhibition (e.g., Aron et al., 2003; Chambers et al., 2006; Garavan, Ross, & Stein, 1999) , which is further consistent with this account.
The mechanism by which top-down goals involuntarily drive motoric inhibition remains largely unexplored. It is unknown whether goal-modulated motoric inhibition can be triggered involuntarily, reflecting a stimulus-driven process. In Verbruggen and Logan's (2008) demonstration of involuntary motoric inhibition, the response-associated stimuli were always relevant to the task, requiring observers to select and process them. Further, it is unclear whether currently active top-down goals can involuntarily drive motoric inhibition, or whether such involuntary effects are only evident when observers try to overcome previously learned response associations. Inspired by the above findings and findings in the attention literature concerning top-down contingencies in stimulus selection, we hypothesized that motoric inhibition can reflect a stimulus-driven process that is contingent on the current goals of the observer: when observers represent the goal of inhibiting responses to stimuli defined by a particular feature, motoric inhibition is triggered automatically by the presentation of stimuli that possess this feature.
Stimuli possessing a goal-relevant feature are known to involuntarily trigger a shift of spatial attention contingent on the top-down goals of the observer. Stimuli that share a defining feature with a searched-for target capture attention involuntarily, while stimuli that do not share this feature are ignored, a phenomenon that is referred to as contingent attentional capture (Folk & Anderson, 2010; Folk & Remington, 1998; Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992) . Recently, we have shown that when a feature-defined target is associated with the withholding of a response (i.e., a no-go target), participants adopt an attentional set for inhibiting stimuli that share this feature in a location-specific manner (Anderson & Folk, 2012) . This suggests the possibility that the inhibition of a motor response might be similarly triggered involuntarily based on the goals of the observer, reflecting a common underlying mechanism of automatic goal-directed cognitive control.
In the present study, we investigated whether irrelevant flankers that share a defining feature (a specific color) with a no-go target can selectively elicit motoric inhibition as revealed through a reverse compatibility effect. To this end, we employed a paradigm in which centrally presented targets could be either red or blue, with red targets requiring the execution of a response (go targets) and blue targets requiring the withholding of a response (no-go targets). The targets were preceded by known-to-be irrelevant flankers that could be either compatible or incompatible with the upcoming target in their associated motor response, and they could be either the same color as the go target, the same color as the no-go target, or a different, neutral color (green). The results show that no-go color flankers selectively produce a reverse compatibility effect while the other color flankers are ignored, even when participants are given sufficient time to ignore the flankers and focus exclusively on identifying the target. The results thus demonstrate the involuntary inhibition of a motor response contingent on task goals, suggesting that goal-directed motoric inhibition can proceed in stimulus-driven fashion.
Method Participants
Twenty-four undergraduate students were recruited from the Johns Hopkins University human participant pool. All were screened for normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and color vision, and were compensated with course credit.
Apparatus
A Mac Mini equipped with Matlab software and Psychophysics Toolbox extensions was used to present the stimuli on an Asus VE247 monitor. The participants viewed the monitor from a distance of approximately 50 cm in a dimly lit room. Manual responses were entered by participants using a standard 101-key U.S. layout keyboard.
Stimuli
Each trial involved three different displays (see Figure 1) . The first display consisted of a white fixation cross (1.8°ϫ 1.8°visual angle) presented at the center of a black screen. The second display, the flanker display, consisted of two identical colored flankers (2.75°ϫ 1.4°) presented 2.6°center-to-center to the left and right of the fixation cross. The flankers were red, green, or blue in color. In the third display, the target display, a target letter (2.75°ϫ 1.4°) replaced the fixation cross at the center of the screen while the flankers remained onscreen. The target was either red or blue. Each trial was followed by an intertrial interval (ITI) that consisted of a blank screen. The letters that were used for the flankers and target were A, B, X, and Y.
Design
The experiment consisted of 8 blocks of 96 trials. Within each block, target color (red and blue), target identity (A, B, X, and Y), flanker color (red, green, and blue), flanker compatibility (compatible and incompatible), and flanker-target stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) (200 and 1,500 ms) were fully crossed and counterbalanced, and trials were presented in a random order. This resulted in 16 go trials and 16 no-go trials for each flanker color in a given block; half of each were compatible trials and half of each were incompatible trials.
Procedure
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible while minimizing errors, and to respond only to red (go) targets while withholding responses to blue (no-go) targets. Participants were also informed that the flankers were irrelevant to the task and did not predict the upcoming target, and that they should focus exclusively on preparing for the upcoming target when the flankers appeared.
Each trial began with the fixation display for a randomly varying period of 400, 500, or 600 ms. After this period, two identical flankers were presented along with the fixation cross for either 200 or 1,500 ms. Following the flanker display, the central fixation cross was replaced with the target letter while the flankers remained onscreen for 100 ms. The screen then turned blank and waited until the participant responded or 1,300 ms had elapsed, after which the trial timed out. Each trial was followed by a blank ITI lasting 1,000 ms.
If the target was red, participants were instructed to identify it as either an A or a B by pressing the m key and as either an X or a Y by pressing the z key. Participants were additionally instructed to withhold a response to blue targets. False alarms (responses to blue targets), misses (failing to respond to red targets), and incorrect responses to red targets were all considered errors. The flankers could either be compatible or incompatible with the response associated with the target letter, but the target and flanker letters were never identical. The computer emitted a 500-ms-long 1,000
Hz tone to inform the participant when an error was made. Response times (RTs) for error trials were not included in the analysis, and all RTs exceeding three standard deviations of the mean of a given condition for a given participant were trimmed.
Results
False alarms (FAs) Simple effects analyses revealed a significant reverse-compatibility effect for blue (no-go) colored flankers [F(1, 23) ϭ 18.12, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .283], but no significant compatibility effect for either red (go) or green (neutral) colored flankers (both Fs Ͻ 1). Tukey's HSD revealed that the reverse-compatibility effect was significantly larger for the blue no-go color flankers than for either the red or green flankers, which did not differ. Even at the longer SOA, when participants had 1,500 ms to prepare for the upcoming target and ignore the flankers, a robust reverse compatibility effect was observed for the no-go colored flankers [t(23) ϭ Ϫ3.64, p Ͻ .005, d ϭ .74] that was not evident for either of the other two colored flankers [both ts Ͻ 0.35]. Accuracy was overall high, and the same 3 ϫ 2 ANOVA on accuracy revealed no main effects (both Fs Ͻ 1) or interaction [F(2, 46) ϭ 1.25, p Ͼ .25] (see Table 1 ).
Discussion
The inhibition of a motor response is an important aspect of executive function. It has traditionally been assumed that goaldirected motoric inhibition reflects a voluntary cognitive process (e.g., Logan, 1983; Logan & Cowan, 1984) . Cases of involuntary motoric inhibition have been reported, but many of these cases involved inhibition mediated by low-level perceptual processes such as inhibition of return and priming (e.g., Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Fuentes et al., 1999; Jaśkowski, 2009; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002; Vivas et al., 2007) . The perseveration of previously learned stimulusϪno-response associations has been reported (Lenartowicz et al., 2011; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008) , suggesting the possibility that top-down goals for inhibiting a motor response can be triggered automatically by a goal-relevant stimulus. In the present study, we provide a direct test of such contingent involuntary motoric inhibition.
Our results show that when observers establish a top-down set for withholding a response to blue targets in a go/no-go paradigm, blue-colored flankers generate a reverse compatibility effect consistent with the inhibition of their associated motor response. This reverse compatibility effect was specific to flankers carrying the no-go associated color and did not occur for other-colored flankers. A reverse compatibility effect was also evident even at the longer 1,500 ms SOA, when observers had sufficient time to focus their attention on the location of the upcoming target, suggesting that the involuntary goal-directed processing of a to-be-inhibited response is robust and difficult to suppress.
The motoric inhibition observed in the present study is clearly goal-directed, reflecting the involuntary execution of a response strategy based on task contingencies. If the observed reverse compatibility effect merely reflected lingering inhibition of a canceled motor response, then it would be expected to also occur for the go-target-colored flankers, which should elicit the strongest prepotent response signal. The same outcome would be expected if the observed reverse compatibility effect was the consequence of a voluntary strategy for inhibiting inappropriate responses, as responses to all colored flankers were considered inappropriate. It should also be noted that our results cannot be explained by grouping effects for nontarget color flankers, as the compatibility effect was significantly different for blue and green flankers despite the fact that both differed in color from the target. Rather, the selectivity of the observed reverse compatibility effect suggests that it is the involuntary consequence of a top-down strategy for inhibiting responses associated with a no-go target, which is automatically applied on the basis of a no-go associated feature (in this case, color).
It should be noted that the go-color and neutral-color flankers did not produce a compatibility effect even at the shorter 200 ms SOA, which is consistent with previous findings (Flowers & Wilcox, 1982) . This supports the notion that the typical flanker compatibility effect arises from competition between the flanker and target, which is greatly reduced when the flanker and target are presented sequentially. The fact that we observed a reverse compatibility effect for no-go color flankers at both a short and long SOA in the absence of the typical flanker compatibility effect for other-color flankers suggests that this reverse compatibility effect is not the result of flankerϪtarget competition and is purely an effect of goal-directed processing of the flanker.
Our results echo conceptually similar findings concerning the involuntary influence of task goals on attentional processing (Anderson & Folk, 2012; Folk & Anderson, 2010; Folk & Remington, 1998; Folk et al., 1992) . We show that in the domain of motor control, goal-modulated stimulus processing can be automatically triggered in stimulus-driven fashion. Our results are at odds with a uniquely voluntary account of motoric inhibition and cognitive control more generally, and expand on the hypothesis that goaldirected information processing can proceed in largely automatic fashion. These findings also have implications for how we understand failures of inhibition, such as those that characterize attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (e.g., Alderson, Rapport, & Kofler, 2007) , by suggesting that such failures may not necessarily reflect a deficit in voluntary but rather involuntary cognitive control. 
